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Ernest F. Dibble

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by ERNEST F. DIBBLE *

IN JANUARY 1861, the scene was set in Pensacola and the curtain almost drawn for the first major military confrontation of the Civil War. A crisis over federal property developed in Florida, and except for Fort Pickens at Pensacola and Fort Taylor in Key West, all government installations were seized. In Pensacola, both sides expected hostilities to begin immediately. The navy yard at Warrington, Barrancas barracks, and Fort McRee were taken peacefully, but Lieutenant Adam J. Slemmer, in command of the Pensacola forts, removed all of his men and as much equipment as possible from the other locations into the more strategically located Fort Pickens. At the same time, Florida's senators, David L. Yulee and Stephen R. Mallory, were crystallizing their desire to capture Fort Pickens. Senator Yulee echoed the thoughts of many others in stating that "the naval station and forts at Pensacola are first in consequence." [1] Senator Mallory, on January 10, telegraphed Colonel William H. Chase, in charge of the gathering rebel forces in Pensacola, stating he expected Pickens and McRee to be captured.[2] However, Colonel Chase did not push the conquest, even though Lieutenant Slemmer sat in the ill-prepared fort with only eighty-one men and refused to surrender. Chase advised Senator Mallory that the capture of Pickens would have to involve a direct assault with many casualties. In the face of this advice, rebelling leaders in Washington conferred and decided not to attack Pickens. The seceding states were poorly organized militarily and politically,

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1. David Levy Yulee to Joseph Finegan, quoted in "More Forts Seized," *Atlanta Century*, January 6, 1861.
2. William Watson Davis, *Civil War and Reconstruction in Florida* (New York, 1913; facsimile edition, Gainesville, 1964), 79-80. The story of the truce of Pickens is detailed by Davis, inspired perhaps by his having been brought up in Pensacola. A more recent account is Richard N. Current, *Lincoln and the First Shot* (Philadelphia, 1963).

and were wooing the border states just as were the incoming and outgoing federal administrations. Thus, for political rather than military reasons, Yulee and Mallory telegraphed not to attack Fort Pickens. Backed by senators from Texas, Louisiana, Mississippi, Alabama, and Georgia, the Florida senators joined in stating that Pickens was "not worth one drop of blood." [3] This decision not to attack was confirmed and enhanced when the warship *Brooklyn* sailed with two companies aboard to reinforce the ill-manned Fort Pickens. The "Truce of Pickens" was agreed upon on January 28, 1861, wherein the South would not attack and the fort would not be reinforced. The *Brooklyn* was ordered to stand by and not land troops. Thus a very troubled truce began similar to the postponed confrontration at Fort Sumter at Charleston. No time limit was set on this executive agreement between the Buchanan administration and, by then, private citizen Mallory.

Both sides had bought some time. [4] Jefferson Davis and a majority of southern senators were not ready for war to start in January over Fort Pickens. In spite of their collective opinion, however, the truce was a source of real embarrassment to Mallory. His appointment as secretary of the Confederate navy was opposed because of his role in the truce. Mallory himself, as secretary, stated that "it was a fatal error not to have taken Pickins" *[sic]*. [5] He justified his position against the "lying demogogues" by stating that he did all he could before Slemmer retired to Pickens and that he was just a private citizen who gave the administration "a fright." [6]

For President Buchanan, however, the Pickens true was not only successful but consistent with other policies. [7] He had

3. *War of the Rebellion: Official Records of the Union and Confederate Armies* (Washington, 1880-1901), Series 1, Vol. 1, 445. Hereinafter referred to as *Official Records.*
4. John Bassett Moore, ed., *Works of James Buchanan,* 12 vols. (New York, 1908-1911), XI, 285-86. Buchanan states that Scott and others understood the truce to exist only for the duration of the Peace Convention assembling in Washington. Others date the truce to March 3. The best studies of the decisions on both sides to break the truce are in John Shipley Tilley, *Lincoln Takes Command* (Chapel Hill, 1941), and Grady McWhitney, *Braxton Bragg and Confederate Defeat* (New York, 1969), I.
5. Stephen R. Mallory to unknown, March 22, 1861, *American Historical Review,* XII (October 1906), 104.
6. *Ibid.,* 104-08.
7. *The Works of James Buchanan,* XI, 285-86, implies that Pickens could not have been defended and therefore the truce was a favorable one.

already revealed a capacity to postpone decisions or showdown. Believing that the states had no right to secede, he felt that the federal government had no right to use force to keep them from seceding. Therefore, the best solution to any problem was to overlook or postpone. The troubled truce for Pickens and Sumter saved Buchanan from decision and cascaded the problem into Lincoln's hands. When the President was inaugurated, debate continued on federal policy. The fate of the Pickens truce would be worked out as Lincoln decided, enunciated, and enforced policy on all federal property in seceded states. The President did not want to provoke conflict, but he felt he had to do something other than make what he considered a total retreat from federal property. Lincoln also believed pro-union strength would keep secession limited only to the lower South. He listened to advice from many quarters, including a persuasiveargument from Secretary of State William H. Seward to give up Fort Sumter and to make a symbolic stand for the Union at Fort Pickens. Pickens or Sumter was one of the first decisions Lincoln was forced to make. Why Seward argued for Pickens, and why Lincoln rejected his advice, needs a new appraisal. The course and fate of the secession movement would be determined in part by this decision.

While the truce of Pickens was being worked out, Senator Seward was in Washington acting as untitled head of the Republican party and self-designated savior of the Union. Among his other self-appointed chores, he stated that "I have assumed a sort of dictatorship for defense" [8] Seward relied for military advice on Captain Montgomery C. Meigs. [9] They had been conversing and corresponding since the early 1850s. Captain Meigs had looked to Seward as an ally in his work on the Capitol dome, and he had served in Florida long enough to develop a special interest in her forts. As early as November 1860, he had written to General Winfield Scott urging that Florida forts needed safeguarding because they were ripe for plucking. [10]

For further opinion that Pickens could have been taken, see Julien C. Yonge, "Pensacola in the War for Southern Independence," *Florida Historical Quarterly*, XXXVII (January-April 1959), 359.

8. Henry W. Temple, "William Seward," in Samuel Flagg Bemis, *The American Secretaries of State and Their Diplomacy*, 10 vols. (New York, 1928), VII, 19.
9. This relationship was noted by Gideon Welles, Frederic Bancroft, and others, but not analyzed.
10. Davis, *Civil War and Reconstruction in Florida*, 70-71.

General Scott did not respond to Meigs' request. However, Seward did act to reinforce Fort Pickens as soon as he was in a position to do so. He used as his agent the same Captain Meigs who had noted to him in a letter written in July 1860, that "I have never spoken with you without feeling strengthened in patriotism and devotion to the right and hope that in all my future career I may be able to merit and to retain the approbation which has thus far encouraged me." [11] Seward's Fort Pickens policy was definitely determined by the advice of Meigs, who received not just approbation but a generalship several months after successfully playing a role for Seward in the future Fort Pickens reinforcement.

While Lincoln remained in Sprinfigeld, Illinois, Seward was in Washington, and he was looked upon as spokesman for the incoming administration. His advice to the President-elect in the eventful January days was that Lincoln would meet a hostile confederacy when inaugurated and would have to "reduce it by force or conciliation." [12] Seward argued that "every thought that we think ought to be conciliatory, forbearing and paternal." [13] Seward had chosen the path of conciliator, though not wanting to be called a compromiser of principle. He tried to disregard advice given to him by Northerners, like Charles Francis Adams, who advised against compromising even one inch, for "Slavery and Freedom can no more harmonize in a Republican government than an acid and alkali in a bottle. One or the other, after a struggle, predominates, but first a struggle will ensue." [14] Thurlow Weed, Seward's mentor, added his advice that Fort Sumter must be provisioned in order not to provide the disgrace of retreat. [15] In contrast, Henry Dana Ward advised giving up Fort Sumter because "the union feeling both north and south is strong enough to crush out secession if it can only have time to work." [16] In addition, Seward received mail from as far

11. M. C. Meigs to William H. Seward, July 2, 1860, William H. Seward Collection, Rush Rhees Library, University of Rochester. Hereinafter referred to as Seward Papers. See also background correspondence revealing Meigs-Seward relationships, August 14, 1856, February 11, December 12, 1857.
12. Seward to Lincoln, January 27, 1861, Papers of Abraham Lincoln, Library of Congress. Hereinafter referred to a Lincoln Papers.
13. *Ibid.*
14. Charles Francis Adams to Seward, February 9, 1861, Seward Papers.
15. Thurlow Weed to Seward, March 12, 1861, Seward Papers.
16. Henry Dana Ward to Seward, March 9, 1861, Seward Papers.

away as New Orleans expressing the hope that he would be the leading conciliator to give the southern union men a chance to have their influence felt. [17] This latter advice, Seward pursued with great diligence. He was the chief contact man with a group of southern statesmen attempting to find a peaceful means of resolving the impending conflict before the inauguration of Lincoln. [18] And he had urged just after the Florida and other southern senators left the senate that their committee membership be reserved for them, so they could resume the seats whenever they wished. [19]

After March 4, real confusion existed as to whether the Pickens truce was still in effect. [20] The truce had been strained for some time even before Lincoln's inauguration. Upon Lieutenant Slemmer's complaint, Colonel Chase had stopped erecting batteries aimed in the direction of Fort Pickens. However, Chase's successor, General Braxton Bragg, used the truce interlude to build batteries, to enlarge the army to 5,000 well-trained men, and to manufacture shot and shell. He procured $40,000 which he used to attempt to gain Fort Pickens through bribing federal troops.[22] Bragg took such actions "as a means of defense, and especially so under the threats of the new administration." [23] It has also been shown that Jefferson Davis hoped to do at Pickens what Lincoln has been accused of doing at Sumter-maneuvering the other side to fire the first shot. [24] But Pickens could only be captured by taking the offensive initiative of a ladder assault. War thus came to Fort Sumter, according to one historian, "only because the Confederates were neither subtle enough nor strong enough to begin at Fort Pickens." [25]

17. See, for example, Thomas S. Bacon to Seward, February 17, 1861, Seward Papers. Glyndon P. Van Deusen, *William H. Seward* (New York, 1967), 276-77, notes that John A. Gilmer, North Carolina member of Congress, was a significant influence on Seward's acceptance of this argument.
18. Frederic Bancroft, *Life of William H. Seward,* 2 vols. (Gloucester, 1899), II, 16, credits Seward "almost alone" with saving the Union on March 4.
19. Occie Clubs, "Stephen Russell Mallory, The Elder" (M.A. thesis, University of Florida, 1936), 219.
20. Convincing information exists that both sides were being less than honest on the question. Tilley, *Lincoln Takes Command,* and McWhiney, *Braxton Bragg.*
21. *Official Records,* Series 1, Vol. 1, 359. See pages 360-65, for troubles in keeping the truce.
22. Davis, *Civil War and Reconstruction in Florida,* 112-13.
23. *Official Records,* Series 1, Vol. 1, 362.
24. Grady McWhiney, *Braxton Bragg,* I, 167-69, 172-73.
25. *Ibid.,* 173.

Meanwhile, the federals near Pensacola acted consistent with the truce while Washington leaders were deciding when to break it. Major Tower, aboard the *Sabine* off Pensacola, informed Captain Meigs on March 27 that he went in and out of Fort Pickens whenever he chose, but did not reside there because Captain H. A. Adams on the *Brooklyn* and Lieutenant Slemmer thought it might be considered a violation of the truce. [26] Lieutenant Slemmer tried to maintain the truce spirit by returning all runaway Negroes who sought freedom and protection in Fort Pickens. [27]

In Washington, however, the decision to break the truce by reinforcing Pickens had already been made. General Scott on March 12 and directed the troops on the *Brooklyn* to disembark. His order reached Pensacola on March 31, but Captain Adams would not accept an army order. A naval authorization to land the troops was not received until April 12, the day Fort Sumter was attacked. While General Scott was ordering the *Brooklyn* to land troops, Seward was also involved in organizing reinforcements. Seward had received advice from Captain Meigs that "Porter should be ordered to take the *Powhatan* and sail from N. Y. into Pensacola Harbor at once." [28] Seward took his advice, and during a conference Meigs and Seward had with Lincoln, Seward secured the President's consent to order the *Powhatan* fitted out to reinforce Fort Pickens without the knowledge of Secretary of the Navy Gideon Welles. This created a crisis because just as the *Powhatan* was ready to sail, Welles ordered it retained for Sumter. Meigs telegraphed to Seward from New York City: "What is to be done?" [29] The issue was supposedly straightened out in Welles' favor in a meeting with Lincoln, but because Seward countermanded a presidential

26. Meigs to Seward, mistakingly dated March 1, 1861, Seward Papers.
27. *Official Records*, Series 1, Vol. 1, 362.
28. Meigs to Seward, March 1, 1861, Seward Papers. Colonel Harvey Brown was actually given command with Captain Meigs accompanying him. See *Official Records*, Series 1, Vol. 1, 365-66. Allan Nevins, *War For the Union* (New York, 1959), thought Seward wanted to give up both Sumter and Pickens, but Van Deusen, *Seward*, 600, disagrees with this thesis.
29. Meigs to Seward, April 5, 1861, Seward Papers. Thornton Kirkland Lothrop, *William Henry Seward* (Boston, 1899), 235-36, erroneously claims that Seward had little or nothing to do with the *Powhatan* incident. Meigs' diary explanation of these incidents is given in "General M. C. Meigs on the conduct of the Civil War," *American Historical Review*, XXVI (January 1921), 285-303.

order with his own signature, the *Powhatan* continued on April 6 to reinforce Pickens.

Seward had given Captain Meigs $10,000 cash to buy provisions and to pave the way for reinforcement. [30] Apparently Seward had a special slush fund with which to run the navy. He was, without question, the individual chiefly responsible for pushing and arranging the reinforcement of Fort Pickens. Secretary Welles, petulant about this state department intrusion into navy jurisdiction, accused Seward of trying to divert ships from Sumter to Pickens. [31] The *Brooklyn* and *Powhatan* incidents were classical examples of the state, navy, and war departments following the Biblical injunction of "not letting thy right hand know what thy left hand doeth."

Lincoln's decision to reinforce Pickens was based upon Seward's urging and Meig's advice, but was not a fulfillment of Seward's desired policy. Seward had argued for several weeks that Pickens and not Sumter be reinforced. On March 15 he wrote out his arguments for the President, still urging that conciliation was the only feasible and promising stance. Seward felt that it would be 'unwise and inhuman" not to attempt to provision Fort Sumter if it could be done peacefully. [32] But Seward was convinced that the attempt would "provoke conflict, and probably initiate a civil war." [33] He argued that Sumter was being held only because as United States property it was "a monument of their authority and sovereignty," but that it was useless as a base of operations. [34] Seward was in no way alone in urging Lincoln to give up Sumter. Five members of the cabinet expressed the same point of view on March 15; only two were for provisioning Sumter. However, during the

30. Meigs to Seward, May 10, 1861, Seward Papers. Meigs returned $6,229.50 to Seward.
31. John T. Moore, Introduction, *Diary of Gideon Welles* (Boston, 1911), 21ff. Welles' later *Galaxy* article charges against Seward are included in his *Lincoln and Seward* (Freeport, 1874). In the literature on this subject, no notice has been taken of the fact that Welles was willing to give up ten ships to the revenue service on March 20, 1861, including the *Powhatan* and three ships in Pensacola, the *Brooklyn, Sabine,* and *Wyandotte.* See Welles to Lincoln, March 20, 1861, Lincoln Papers. Welles shows complete naivete about giving up the ships needed for defense of Pickens and destroys his argument that the loss of the *Powhatan* to Pickens doomed the Sumter expedition to failure.
32. Seward to Lincoln, March 15, 1861. Lincoln Papers.
33. *Ibid.*
34. *Ibid.*

next two weeks all but Seward were persuaded to supply the South Carolina fortress. Only Montgomery Blair opposed provisioning Pickens. General Scott suggested that Lincoln relinquish Pickens as a conciliatory gesture. All of the President's advisors, even Seward, were giving up hope of solving the secession crisis by conciliation. [35] Seward, after the March 29 defeat of his viewpoint in the Cabinet, strongly set forth in a memorandum to Lincoln his belief that Sumter and Pickens were different situations:

> My system is built upon this idea as a ruling one, namely that we must
> *Change the question before the Public from one upon Slavery, or about Slavery*
> for a question upon *Union or Disunion*
> In other words, from what would be regarded as a Party question to one of *Patriotism or Union*
> The Occupation or evacuation of Fort Sumter, although not in fact a slavery, or a party question is so *regarded.* Witness, the temper manifested by the Republicans in the Free States, and even by Union men in the South.
> I would therefore terminate it as a safe means for changing the issue. I deem it fortunate that the last Administration created the necessity.
> For the rest. I would simultaneously defend and reinforce all the Forts in the Gulf, and have the Navy recalled from foreign stations to be prepared for a blockade. Put the Island of Key West under Martial Law.
> This will raise distinctly the question of *Union or Disunion.* I would maintain every fort and possession in the South. [36]

Lincoln answered Seward immediately: "Again, I do not perceive how the re-inforcement of Fort Sumter would be done on a slavery, or party issue, while that of Fort Pickens would be on a more national, and patriotic one." [37]

35. Salmon P. Chase revealed that the cabinet members' change of mind was based on the conviction that peaceful solutions were no longer feasible. See David Donald, ed., *Inside Lincoln's Cabinet: The Civil War Diaries of Salmon P. Chase* (New York, 1954), 10.
36. Roy P. Basler, ed., *Collected Works of Abraham Lincoln,* 8 vols. (New Brunswick, 1953), IV, 317.
37. *Ibid.,* IV, 316. Patrick Sowle, "A Reappraisal of Sewards' Memorandum of April 1, 1816, to Lincoln," *Journal of Southern History,* XXXIII (May 1967), 234 ff., corrects the Bancroft story by revealing that Seward, Thurlow Weed, and Henry J. Raymond, editor of the *New York Times,* expected Lincoln to approve the memorandum and planned to publish the results and push Seward's leadership.

The reason usually advanced why Seward wanted to give up Sumter and make a stand at Pickens stresses political power relations of Seward with Lincoln. Seward had fully expected to become President and did not wholly respect the gangling backwoods upstart who had taken his job. Seward had played a role before the inauguration which he intended to continue-running the government behind the figure of a President he considered much less capable than himself. When the rest of the cabinet turned against his advice on March 29, Seward's role in the administration and his political reputation were at stake. He had committed himself prematurely by statements to Southerners and Northerners that Sumter would be abandoned, so the decision to reinforce that fort was now extremely embarassing. Therefore, according to Frederic Bancroft, chief exponent of this interpretation, Seward presented to the President as "A last, desperate effort" his thoughts on domestic and foreign policy, which "resembled a reckless invention of a mind driven to desperate extremes, as a sole means of escape from ruin." [38] Traditionally interpreted, Seward's political role was at stake and this is supposed to explain his Pickens policy, even if he never admitted it himself. Seward, however, offered several reasons for his Pickens policy which have not been seriously analyzed.

Seward's desire to reinforce Pickens and let the southern forces have Sumter was due in part to practical military considerations. He believed that Pickens was defensible and that Sumter could not be reinforced and defended. Since there were not enough troops and ships to protect all military properties, what was available should be committed to Pickens. General Scott sometimes supported this position. Scott, very old, very fat, and very inconsistent, argued at one time during these crucial months that all forts should be reinforced and defended and also argued that all forts should be abandoned. Even so, a significant number of military advisors, including Captain Meigs of course, backed Seward's belief that the defense of Pickens was feasible, while the defense of Sumter was not. Pickens was defensible with few men in the fort as long as aided

38. Bancroft, *Seward,* 132-34. Van Deusen's superior biography does not analyze Seward in respect to the subject of this article.

by enough ships and men available nearby. [39]

Another reason Seward advanced for choosing Pickens was symbolic. Lincoln dismissed the difference in symbolic ingredients rather curtly, and as a result so have past commentators. But Seward seriously advanced the idea of symbolically exchanging Pickens for Sumter. To him, the question with any federal fort was not just one of property, it involved the principle of union itself. Seward had already tried to convince Lincoln that Sumter was worthwhile to the Union only as a symbol. But to Seward Pickens was also a symbol, and it was more useful than Sumter because it was less explosive, more defensible, and more necessary due to the disturbances in Santo Domingo, Mexico, and Texas. The Confederate Congress had already expressed the South's desire to secure both Sumter and Pickens. But from Seward's point of view Pickens could become a purer symbol of the Union and the war could be limited, especially if Sam Houston managed to swing Texas with the Union. Pickens was a more smoldering issue and afforded the extra time that Seward and the peace-unionists wanted.

No deep thinking into the uses of religious or national symbolisms preceded Seward's attempt to save the Union by substitution of symbols. Indeed, Seward's religious attitudes were superficial. Instead, the politician had manipulated national symbols as part of his learned habit on the stump. He was correct in viewing a federal fort to be as much a symbol of the Union as the American flag itself. However, the rebel leaders from January to April 1861, were taking the initiative in choosing where the symbolic confrontation would take place. Confederate leaders rejected Pickens by proposing and abiding by the truce of Pickens. This is the real significance of the truce. In the meantime, Sumter had become more and more an inflamatory situation, and the eyes of the nation were riveted on Charleston harbor. General Beauregard took command and the people of both sections were aroused. Fort Sumter became the symbol because both sides were more emotionally committed there.

Seward's April 1 memorandum to Lincoln was also concerned with foreign policy questions. Not only was this his chief

39. Lengthy analyses of Pickens' defense needs were provided Seward in letters from Meigs, April 18, 1861, and from Washington, May 17, 18, 1861, Seward Papers.

concern as secretary of state, but months before assuming office he had entertained foreign policy or foreign war as a solution to internal stress. [40] And the day before his memorandum, he had received information that Spain was starting a possible military action into Santo Domingo. A revolutionary junta had proclaimed for Spain, and Seward expected it to try to annex the island. In direct response to this and the European threat to Mexico, both areas even then being of primary concern under the Monroe Doctrine, the secretary of state reacted by arguing that the fleet should be brought back from foreign waters and relocated in the Gulf of Mexico. Explanations were to be demanded, and a foreign war was contemplated. In this context, Fort Pickens assumed an even larger significance to Seward. To the revisionist historians of the twentieth century who are examining the relationship of foreign war to domestic stress, the argument that Seward advanced becomes even more meaningful. [41]

In the great debate over the crisis of 1861, Fort Sumter looms large, and Fort Pickens figures only as an attempted antidote. Lincoln has often been accused of attempting to provoke the South to fire the first shot at Sumter. [42] Seward is looked upon more favorably, partly because he was right about the inability of the Union to reinforce Sumter. But the converse side of this conclusion is not necessarily correct. Seward's conciliatory policy, including substituting Pickens for Sumter, had little chance of success. His attempt to conciliate had a very bad press in the South. [43] "Higher Law" Seward was not trusted as "the great pacificator." And he offered no compromise; all he offered was a last-chance symbolic substitution of forts. Lincoln was correct in curtly writing that he did "not perceive" how it would work. By overcommitting himself too late to a too superficial trick of substituting Pickens for Sumter, Seward failed in his role as the nation's mediator.

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40. Van Deusen, *Seward*, 247-48.
41. Recent revisionist writers on foreign war as a solution to domestic crisis include Walter LaFeber, *The New Empire: An Interpretation of American Expansion, 1860-1898* (Ithaca, 1963).
42. For an example, see Charles W. Ramsdell, "Lincoln and Fort Sumter," *Journal of Southern History*, III (August 1937), 260-88.
43. Dwight Lowell Dumond, *Southern Editorials on Secession* (Gloucester, 1931), 164-67, 395-97, 404-06, 411-13.

The opening of war over Fort Sumter did not end discussion about Fort Pickens' role during the crisis days. The personalities involved provide a denouement. Seward's Pickens policy came to public view in a postwar debate forced by Gideon Welles. Not only in his *Diary*, but in other publications, Welles rehashed the Sumter-Pickens debate. He claimed that Lincoln and his cabinet knew nothing about the truce of Pickens when first in office. Since Seward was in Turkey at the time, General Meigs, the man so well rewarded for his Fort Pickens role, came to his friend's public defense with evidence that should have convinced even Mr. Welles. [44]

One other personality involved in the Fort Pickens incident suffered even more criticism than Seward. Stephen R. Mallory had also attempted to avoid war through a Pickens policy even though subjected "to the odium of the extremists." [45] This attack on him for the truce rankled Mallory so much that he wrote to his wife from prison after the war about how his "interference to prevent the attack on Fort Pickens brought down the thunders of denunciation." [46] Mrs. Mallory was apparently so much concerned with local criticism that, while still in Bridgeport, Connecticut, she wrote to him in Pensacola to ask whether the town was still against him for the Pickens truce. [47] Mallory responded to this question by saying, "You ask how the people treat me. Kindly, I think, as much as their condition and nature permit." He indicated that at a public meeting, "they called me out most heartedly." [48]

If the Pensacola public called him out most heartedly, Seward generously helped Mallory out of prison. As soon as he was put in jail, Mallory wrote to Seward for support in gaining a pardon. He also asked his wife to visit both Seward and President Johnson, "both of whom know me well, and with both of

44. Meigs to Seward, April 6, 1871, Seward Papers. Meigs wrote to explain to Seward what evidence he was gathering for publications against Welles' *Galaxy* article.
45. Mallory to his wife, June 12, 1865, P.K. Yonge Library of Florida History, University of Florida, Gainesville. Occie Clubbs, "Stephen Russell Mallory, The Elder," provides a powerful defense of Mallory against his critics, revising his reputation in a manner similar to and amplified by Joseph T. Durkin, *Stephen R. Mallory: Confederate Navy Chief* (Chapel Hill, 1954).
46. *Ibid*.
47. Durkin, *Stephen R. Mallory*, 163-64.
48. Mallory to his wife, September 1866, Pensacola Historical Museum.

whom my relations have ever been kind and cordial." [49] Seward did all that he could as "proof of an old esteem," [50] and Mallory appreciated the kindness shown. In a letter to his wife he noted with a tone of appreciation that Seward had removed his father-in-law, Don Francisco Moreno, as Spanish counsel in Pensacola for causes only of "expedience," overlooking charges that Moreno had helped the Confederates cause. [51] The day after Mallory officially received his pardon, he wrote to thank Seward for his "interposition," stating in his usual Victorian fashion that, "I trust, my dr. Sir, that any who may bear a drop of my blood in his veins may, in years to come, regard himself as having 'eaten your salt,' and as owing a debt of gratitude to your posterity, to be loyally, faithfully shown." [52] Thus, Pensacola's Mallory, who did all he could to peacefully bring about secession from the Union, expressed his great regard for Seward, who did all he could do to peacefully preserve the union.

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49. Mallory to his wife, July 20, 1865, typescript copy in Pensacola Historical Museum.
50. Seward to Mallory, July 3, 1865, Seward Papers.
51. Mallory to his wife, June 22, 1866, Pensacola Historical Museum. The story of Don Francisco Moreno's help to Confederates is told in William C. Holbrook, *A Narrative of the Services of the Officers and Enlisted Men of the 7th Regiment of Vermont Volunteers (Veterans) from 1862 to 1866* (New York, 1882), 128 ff.
52. Mallory to Seward, October 1, 1867, Seward Papers. A comparison of this letter with one to President Johnson (Mallory to Andrew Johnson, October 1, 1867, Papers of Andrew Johnson, Library of Congress, indicates how clearly Mallory felt a debt to Seward for his pardon.